Kwazulu natal gaming and betting act 8 of 2010

Published в Mona crypto | Октябрь 2, 2012

kwazulu natal gaming and betting act 8 of 2010

KwaZulu-Natal Gaming and Betting Tax Act, A total of 23 interns were accommodated on an IT internship in eight departments, and The KwaZulu-Natal Gaming and Betting Act 8 of (herein after referred to as “the Act”) came into effect on 1 April and sets out the. KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. KwaZulu-Natal Gaming and Betting Tax Act, Act 9 of Legislation as at 1 November MONEY MANAGEMENT FOREX YANG BAIK DAN

South Africa is known as one of the largest countries participate in UK49s lottery draw operated by Ladbrokes Coral. Gambling revenue from the National Lottery is projected to increase to R2. With the largest being the Rio Casino Resort , which is also the largest casino in Africa and the fifth-largest casino in the world. Horse racing[ edit ] On-track betting on horse races was the only legal form of gambling in South African until Due to its complexity and the difficulty of attracting new players it did not effectively compete with the newly introduced National Lottery and casino games.

To offer online betting bookies must be licensed by one of these boards. As of May , no additional tax is charged to recreational bettors, and recreational gambling winnings are not considered income for income tax purposes. Online gaming laws[ edit ] The National Gambling Act prohibited both offering interactive gambling services and engaging in interactive games games on the Internet.

It's however important to note interactive gambling relates specifically to games such as casino, poker and bingo. Online sports betting, online horse race betting and the business of bookmaking is lawful in South Africa, provided that the person conducting such business holds the necessary provincial bookmaker's licence s , or is using a website with proper licence s.

The National Gambling Amendment Act of that was published in July was meant to be an attempt to legalise interactive gambling in the country and make provisions for the regulation of this market. The Amendment Act was actively confronted by the interested parties land-based gambling houses and anti-money laundering authorities. The deponent stated that over that seven year period technology with respect to EBTs had advanced significantly. Afrisun was granted leave to intervene?

The application was adjourned to 28 April and directions were given as to when the record was to be delivered, supplementary affidavits in terms of Rule 53 4 to be filed, and further affidavits and all heads of argument to be delivered. All questions of costs were reserved.

Supplementary Affidavit in terms of Rule 53 4?. The significant features of these supplementary papers from the perspective of the matters now before the court were the following. In paragraphs 2 to 6 of the amended notice of motion Afrisun sought orders reviewing and setting aside the earlier decisions of the Board to approve the applications for registration of gaming equipment granted in favour of the suppliers; to declare the EBTs manufactured or distributed or sold by the suppliers as impermissible that is to say impermissible under law ; and in the alternative to such a declaratory order, an order directing the terminals to be produced for inspection by Afrisun after which Afrisun should be allowed further time to supplement its papers.

The notice of motion asserted a right on behalf of Afrisun to amend and to vary the terms of its motion in terms of Rule 53 4 after receipt of these fresh records. I will revert to this topic later. These were opposed. There were also general objections to the intervention of Afrisun in the review proceedings launched by the Premier. In essence these were the remaining intervention applications, the objections to Afrisun?

The case was otherwise postponed sine die. However the arguments extended beyond what was contemplated in the order of 28 April because of subsequent events. I turn to those. In the alternative Afrisun asked that it be permitted to pursue the application as a party thereto. On 22 June this court Koen J delivered judgment in that application, granting the alternative relief, declaring that Afrisun is?

Because of the present litigation the Board? However, following the amendment, the requisite licence conditions were altered, licences were issued, and the requisite processes followed and permissions granted which had the effect of the various bingo halls actually offering the game of bingo utilising EBTs. All this became the subject of fresh review proceedings instituted by Afrisun in The learned Judge decided that he could not deal with that argument, dispositive as it might turn out to be of the issue he had to decide, because it had not been canvassed in the papers.

He continued at paragraph 57 of the judgment as follows. It might however be that in the future management of this litigation attention be directed to defining the factual foundation, whether by the exchange of affidavits or some form of stated case, for this issue also to be addressed.? The Board itself, which had not as a body previously taken any part in the proceedings, now sought also to put in an affidavit raising, inter alia, the fact that the present application had become academic, and that it ought to be dismissed on that account.

The Board also sought leave to withdraw from its earlier position, that it would abide the decision of this court in the review proceedings. This was not relief sought by the Premier; and neither was this new relief disclosed to the other parties when they consented to an order permitting the joinder of Afrisun in the Premier?

Having become a co-applicant it exercised its right under Rule 53 4 to deliver a supplementary founding affidavit. It notionally had the right also under that rule to amend its notice of motion; but it did not have one. It therefore delivered a fresh notice of motion. There it sought, in paragraphs 2 to 6 of its prayer, to introduce the further decisions it wished to challenge.

But of course the records of those administrative decisions were not before the court as they were not required to be delivered under the original notice of motion. If the new challenge was to proceed, it would require the records of another three sets of administrative decisions to be furnished. To achieve access to those records Afrisun? The document was in effect a notice of motion starting fresh proceedings against the suppliers in respect of the decisions to register machines which had been made in favour of each of them.

It reads as follows. The applicant may within 10 days after the registrar has made the record available to him or her, by delivery of a notice and accompanying affidavit, amend, add to or vary the terms of his or her notice of motion and supplement the supporting affidavit.?

The purpose of rule 53 is to? The requirement in rule 53 1 b that the decision-maker file the record of decision is primarily intended to operate in favour of an applicant in review proceedings. It helps ensure that review proceedings are not launched in the dark. The record enables the applicant and the court fully and properly to assess the lawfulness of the decision-making process.

It allows an applicant to interrogate the decision and, if necessary, to amend its notice of motion and supplement its grounds for review.? References excluded. That understanding seems to underlie the description of the process in the passage from Helen Suzman Foundation just quoted above, although it must be observed immediately that the Constitutional Court was not in that case seized with the issue which arises here. Obviously the record of the decision may reveal grounds of review not stated in the original founding affidavit.

These would be dealt with in the supplementary affidavit. It may be revealed that the decision under review was mis-described, perhaps as to its precise ambit or as to when it was made, and so on. That would justify an amendment to the notice of motion. I would venture to suggest, although that issue does not arise in this case, that the notice of motion may be amended to cite further respondents if the record reveals circumstances which render their joinder compulsory.

That is what occurred in Pieters v Administrateur, Suidwes-Afrika en? The applicant in that matter had applied under Rule 53 to review the refusal of his application for a permit to enter and remain in the country then known as South-West Africa. He required permission as he had not been born there.

His application was dismissed in September The record of the proceedings was provided. In that record reference was made to some five earlier decisions all of which had the effect of denying the applicant the right to be in the country. The applicant used the provisions of Rule 53 4 to amend his notice of motion so as to bring those earlier decisions under review as well.

Whilst the record supplied by the respondent mentioned the earlier decisions, it did not constitute a record of them. The applicant chose to have this rectified by calling for discovery of those records. That was resisted by the respondents inter alia on the basis that those decisions were not actually brought under review in the proceedings. The court Hoexter J disagreed. Whilst the decision to compel discovery of the record of the earlier decisions was made ultimately on the basis that they formed part of the record of the decision, and had accordingly to be produced, the learned Judge at E-G appeared to have no difficulty with the proposition that the applicant could amend his notice of motion to bring those earlier decisions under review.

First of all, the parties to the earlier decisions were the same as the parties to the decision identified in the original notice of motion. Secondly, as I understand the facts, the earlier decisions were of the same type as the decision, and indeed informed the refusal of the application made in Here the position is different. Likewise, the impugned decisions i.

The two decision types are quite separate and were dealt with in separate and different administrative proceedings. Afrisun wished to make the case against the bingo operators that the EBTs could not lawfully be regarded as bingo machines.

If they had been separately registered by the Board under s 59 of the Act on earlier occasions, those registrations would at the very least on the face of it render the use of the machines lawful in bingo halls. Section 59 c of the Act reads as follows. A licensee may not use a gaming machine, limited payout machine or gambling equipment or allow any game to be played on a gaming machine or limited payout machine or on or with gaming equipment which?

The proposition was raised in argument before me, and not contradicted, that although the section is rendered in the negative, the effect of it in the context of the Act is that, once any such equipment is? However they argue, correctly in my view, that they have no role to play in these proceedings if the extension of the relief to them by Afrisun, without the leave of the court which was not sought , was impermissible.

Of course, as suppliers of EBTs, they would have been most satisfied with the Board? By no stretch of imagination can that be elevated to the status of a legal interest justifying their compulsory joinder in these proceedings. The issue in that dispute is essentially whether the Board erred in regarding the EBTs registered on the application of the suppliers as having the characteristics justifying their registration under the Act as it was before it was amended.

That raises technical issues to which the bingo operators would have nothing to contribute. The duration of the proceedings would be extended, according to the Goldrush respondents, indefinitely; and the costs for the bingo operators would be increased significantly. I reach that conclusion on the basis of the considerations which support it which have already been discussed above.

That means that the applications to join the suppliers must fail. Paragraph 1. For reasons already given there is no need to consider the intervention applications. The objections to Afrisun? In his order of 22 June Koen J clarified the effect of paragraph 1. Section 6 1 of PAJA is to the effect that? However s 38 of the Constitution deals with who may approach a competent court for appropriate relief upon the basis that a right in the Bill of Rights is being infringed or threatened with infringement.

In its founding affidavit in the intervention application Afrisun asserted a that the decisions made in favour of the bingo operators would bring about that Afrisun would suffer a significant loss of? It is clear that Afrisun claims the right to approach the court on the basis that it is acting in its own interests, as contemplated by s 38 a of the Constitution.

As pointed out in Giant Concerts para 56 :? It is not logical to assert that an own-interest standing qualification arises from participation in a process if the objection remains hypothetical and academic.? In this case all of the bingo halls which were beneficiaries of the impugned decisions were cited, and the relief sought by Afrisun covers all of them, even those whose distance from Afrisun?

All of the beneficiaries of the impugned decisions were originally cited in this matter by the Premier and the MEC for Finance, based on their claim of locus standi to object to the approvals of any licence conditions authorising the use of EBTs in KwaZulu-Natal. Afrisun does not approach the court with the same standing as that claimed by the original two applicants. It had to establish its standing with respect to each of the impugned decisions. In my view it failed to do so.

They are the eleventh, fourteenth, fifteenth, nineteenth and twentieth respondents. Counsel for the respondents conceded in argument that there is enough on the papers to justify the conclusion that Afrisun has standing to challenge the decisions made in favour of those respondents. Rule 30 Application?. After the application to join it had been served on WMS, it delivered a notice in terms of Rule 6 5 d iii notifying Afrisun of questions of law upon the basis of which WMS intended to opposed the application to join it in the review proceedings.

Afrisun objected, complaining according to its founding affidavit in the application in terms of Rule 30 subsequently launched that a the notice was delivered late; and b the notice traversed issues of fact as well as issues of law. The notice delivered by WMS did not call upon the court to make any decisions on fact. A respondent wishing to employ the sub-rule is entitled to raise questions of law which arise from or in the factual matrix revealed in the founding papers.

I can see nothing wrong in mentioning a fact believed to be part of that matrix in the notice in order to contextualise and better explain the question of law the respondent seeks to describe and define. If the identification of a question of law arises from a misunderstanding or misstatement of the facts revealed in the founding papers that does not render the notice invalid. It would render it ineffectual for the respondent?

It raised no issues of fact. It raised questions of law arising from facts already before the court at the time when the notice was delivered. In it he claimed that there was prejudice to Afrisun because he the attorney had already written to the presiding Judge seeking dates to have the matter set down. He complained, as I have said, that the notice raised factual issues and not just legal ones. There was no merit in those complaints when they were made.

The attorney had to have known that the issues raised by WMS would have to be dealt with in the application to join the suppliers, come what may. They were nothing new. One is driven to the conclusion that what was sought to be achieved in the Rule 30 application was the silencing of WMS. In my view the Rule 30 application was at best misguided, and at worst a designedly obstructive tactic of a kind which our courts ought to frown upon.

As WMS has accepted that its notice was delivered late I propose to grant an order condoning that fact, despite my uncertainty as to whether such condonation is necessary. The notice of motion initiating the joinder proceedings was defective, inter alia, because it did not notify WMS of the date by which notice to oppose had to be delivered. On 26 February the Galaxy respondents delivered an application for leave to file their supplementary affidavit, asking that Afrisun pay the costs of the application only if it be opposed.

The Goldrush respondents delivered a similar application on 8 March seeking similar relief, and condonation if it was required for the late delivery of the affidavit. The Board delivered an application on 28 February I will deal with its application separately. They were the amendment to the Act, the judgment of Koen J handed down on 22 June and the institution by Afrisun in September of review proceedings against, inter alia, the Galaxy respondents in which Afrisun sought orders setting aside the various decisions made in i.

Its affidavit asserted that the facts that it wished to place before the court went to the question as to whether the present review proceedings had become academic and as to whether, in the circumstances, Afrisun should be permitted to continue with the present application.

It complained that they had come too late, that they would obstruct the proposed hearing and that the issue as to whether the present proceedings had lost their purpose, and had become moot, should be dealt with when the merits of the review application came to be argued later.

Counsel for Afrisun has argued, correctly in my view, that the affidavits could have been delivered earlier, given that the parties knew certainly by October that they wished to place further affidavits before the court.

However the facts stated in the affidavits are uncontentious, and each of them was within the knowledge of Afrisun from the moment the fact arose. Afrisun was able to produce an affidavit answering the material raised in the supplementary affidavits delivered by the Galaxy and Goldrush respondents, and I am satisfied that there was no disruption to the proceedings before me that mattered.

There was time enough for all parties to prepare on and deal with the issue raised in the supplementary affidavits, that is to say the contention that the present proceedings have become academic and moot and should be stopped now. The matters raised in the supplementary papers were fully argued before me.

An order admitting the supplementary affidavits of Goldrush and Galaxy must accordingly be made. It had decided at the outset to abide the decision of this court in the review application.

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