Forexticket dinar iraq rmd

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forexticket dinar iraq rmd

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He was monitoring my performance in managing IL'Nj inspectors. He believed he only avoided prison because of Ramadan's intervention with Saddam. According to Huwaysh, no minister ever argued in meeiings against Saddam's slated position becauseas unforgivable. It would be suicide.

Huwaysh said Saddam "loved lhe use of force. At Saddam's "one-on-one" weekly meetings with individual heads of security agencics. Saddam had an enthusiastic altitude toward science dating back to when, in the, he found himself in charge of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission IAHC as nan of his responsibilities as Vice President.

Saddam venerated Iraq's historyenter of scientific achievement under individuals like the famous mathematician and astronomer Ibn Al Haylhameespect for many aspects ofto the end. Hasan Al Majid noted Saddam's expansion of the university. Saddam's affinity for Hemingway's story is understandable, given the former president's hackgnmntl, rise to power,of himself and Hemingway's useustic setting similar to Tikrit to express timeless ihemes.

In Hemingways story. Santiagoreat mariin. When the mariin finally dies. Santiagoosing battle to defend his prize from sharks, which reduce the great fish, by the time he returns lo his village,keleton. The story sheds light on Saddam's view of the world and his place in it. The parallels lhat Saddam may tune drawnand Santiago were in their willingnesssuffering anil Itardship tooint andwillingness lo inflict pain on the victims ofto accomplish their objectives.

Saddam tended to characterize,very Hemingway-esque way. Saddam showed aarising fromindsetefusalconventional definitions of defeat. Muchultimately left with only ihe mariin'sas the trophy of his success, to Saddam evenvictory was by hiseal one. How Saddam Saw Himself Saddam's Psychology Saddam 's psychology was shaped powerfullyeprived and violent childhoodillage and tribal society bound by powerful mores. Many of his associates noted how early experiencesasting effect on Saddam's outlook.

Saddam had few friends among top leaders even in. These tics diminished fur-ihcr5 and he focused more on relatives, according to Tariq 'Aziz. Saddam's Personal Sccurily Saddam thought he was under constant threat and he prioritized his personal safety above all administrative Issues. Some of his fear was well founded, but he grew increasingly paranoid asrogressed.

His personal security measures were extreme. For example, the SSOaboratory specifically for the icsting of Saddam's food. An outgrowth of his fear was the building ot multiple palaces, in pan designed to foil attempts by attackers or assassins to locate him. The palaces also reflected lhe faci that Saddam increasingly saw himself as lhe stale and that what was good for him was good tor Iraq.

Saddam wentalace and mosque building extravaganza in lhe,0 consiruction workers, when much of the economv was at Ihe poim of collapse. His rationale for this was concern for his personal security. He staled lhal by building many palaces the US would be unablescertain his whereabouts and thus target him. Military officers as senior as the Commander of lhe SRG, who was responsible for physical proicction of Presidential palaces, were barred from emering any palace without prior written permission.

The attempt on 'Uday's life inlsoeep impact on Saddam, because lhe extensive security infrastructure designed to protect him and his family failedpectacular and public way. The attack marks lhe start of Saddam's decreased visibility with senior officials and increased preoccupation with Regime security. Saddam the Dynasty Founder Saddam's resort to dynastic and familial means of imining Iraq did the most lo undermine institutional decision-making. Saddam saw the state in peisonal terms and his career was markedteady retreat from die Ba'thist idealodern state tomodeledural Arab clan.

Hisbecame reliant on family and clan members throughout. Tariq 'Aziz and Taha Yasin Ramadan commented on the growing and corrosive influence of lhe Tikriti clan on stale conirol at this lime. Relatives dominated leadership positions and progressively diminished the policy as opposedoercive role of the Ba'th Party, livery senior non-TLkriti in the Regime has pointed to Saddam's increasing and destructive resort lo family and clan members to staff sensitive government positions.

He was still searchingompetent and reliable succession that would guarantee his legacy at the lime of his fall. Saddam gradually shifted his reliance on advice from technocrats io family mcmhcis5 onward, according to Tariq 'Aziz. This favored family, who was noi necessarily competent, such us 'Ali Hasan Al Majid, weakened goodaccording to Conner Vice PresidentNonetheless it was accentedeemingly normal part ol administration in Iraq.

Ramadan thought. The last three years with Saddam bothered me the most. Inert were too many relatives in sensitive jobs. My staff will tellould have fixed il" He said, "Saddam was weak with his familyHe punished them, but let them go right back to doing what they were doing in the firstoreover. According lo 'Ali Hasan Al Majid. Qusay's significance stemmed from his perceived influence on his father.

These former senior officials dismiss Qusay'. Saddam gave him security, and some military responsibtliocs. There wasiew rhat Qusay already had more responsibility than he could handle. He was elected1 to the Ba'th Partytepping-stoneventual RCCwhich would have been the mostmarl of his growing importance in the Regime hierarchy.

Saddam also assigned Qusay to theatchdog2 in response to Saddam's dissatisfaction with committeeto the UN. Qusttyember of the tmilitary Committee of Three, which controlled armed forces officer promotions and recommended to Saddam General Officer appointments and promotion. He showed himself profoundly suspicious of recommendations fnwn within the army and oflen disregarded them, accordingormer senior officer.

Qusay was keen to provide Saddam with good military news, according to Walid Hamid Tawfiq. However, he lived in fear of incurring Saddam's displeasure and optimistically exaggeratedlhat he gave in Siiddam. Qusay boasted to his father. Huwaysh said. Saddam and His Sense erf Legacy Saddam was most concerned with his legacy, and he saw il in grand historicis management of the present was alwaysiew io itsin ihe future, and this tended to distort foreign protagonists' perceptions of his current motivations.

He wanted to be remembereduler who had been as significant to Iraq as Hammurabi. Nebuchadnezzar nnd Salah-al-Dinis problem lay in how to define and to achieve Ihis greatness. Even what it was onsist Ol' was hazy. His drive lo preserve his place in Iraqi history outweighed even his feelings toward his family.

Saddamynasty as seemingly ihc best way to guarantee his legacy, but he was clear about the distinction between dynasty and legacy and of the two. At the time of the fall of ihe Regime, he was leaning toward Qusay as successor, but with his second son still very much on probation. A US interviewer noted Saddam spoke of his place in Iraqi history and his family in the same context, hutar greater concern for the former.

Saddam, however, had no plans for an information-based or service sector economy, nor waslace for tourism. The likelihood was that even with peace and no sanctions, Iraq would have been as self-isolated and unconnectedree world as it ever had been under his rule. His personalized and intricate administrative methods meant lhat control of WMD development and its deployment was never far from his touch see the "Excerptslosed-Door Meeting"is chain of command for WMD was optimized for his control rather than to ensure the panicipation of Iraq's normal political, administrative or military structures.

Under this arrangement, the absence of information about WMD in routineand ihe Iraqi military's order of battle would not mean it did not exist. Even so. As with past use. Saddam would have rigorously and personally controlled ihe relevant formations, and have had sole release authority. Saddam's doctrine in the Iran-Iraq war was to separate WMD control from the military's leadership, but lo have its use and controlled by security agencies if miliiary operations required il.

The defense ministry and the senior military staffs formulated national wai plans, but according lo Staff Gen. Sultan'showever seems thin given the likely degree of planning and training necessary for the extensive use of CW by both sides during lhc conflict. He asked ad hoc questions about feasibility of reconstitutingand confined his confidences to hinting that Iraq mighl reconstitute WMD after sanctions.

While he may have said he had lhe desire, no source has claimed lhat Saddam had an explicit strategy or program for the development or use of WMD during the sanctions period. Given the sensitivity of the subject, however, to share such thinking with anybodyew close associates would have been out of character for Saddam, This lackormal statemeni would chime with his autocratic style ofgiven pastwith UN inspections searching for documents.

There arc no indications thai Saddam Issued detailed written instructions to either individual to direct WMD work, as was the practice inhen the programs were highly active. Often the projects' proponents had exaggerated iheir technical merits to obtain Saddam's backing. Desperate to find and exploit any potential military advantage, Saddam would direct the projects for further research and development. However, none of these projects involved WMD.

Saddam's rationale for Ihe possession ofWMD derivedeed for survival and domination. Thisixture of individual, ethnic, and nationalistic pride as well as national security concents particularly regarding Iran. Saddam wanted personalowerful Iraq lhat could project influence on the world stage, and alhat guaranteed both. Saddam sought lhe further industrialization of Iraq, held great hopes for Iraqi science, and saw himself as lhe liberator ofHis vision wasseemingly moslterms of leaving Iraq militarily strong, within appropriate borders and safe from external aggressors, especially Iran.

WMD was one of the means to ihcsc interrelated ends. Saddam felt lhat any country that had theability to develop WMD had an intrinsic right to do so. He saw WMD asymbolormal process of modernity. Saddam's national sccurily policy demanded victory in war.

These concerns led Iraq to develop and maintain WMD programs. Saddam sought foremost personal and Regimeagainst several foreign and domestic enemies. At ihe same time, he sought to restore Iraq's regional influence and io eliminate sanctions. In particular, Saddam was focused on lhe eventual acquisitionuclear weapon, which Tariq 'Aziz said Saddam was fully committed to acquiring despite the absence of an effective program What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successes of WMD The former Regime viewed the four WMD areas nuclear, chemical, biological, and missiles Differences between the views are explainedomplex web of historical military significance, level of prestige it afforded Iraq, capability asoercive tool, and technical factors such as cost and difficulty of production.

We would expect to see varying levels of auention to the four programs and varying efforts to prepare for. Saddam concluded that Iraq's use of CW prevented Iran, with its much greater population and tolerance for casualties, from completely overrunning Iraqi forces, according to former vice president Ramadan. Iraq suffereduantitative imbalance between its conventional forces and those of Iran.

Saddam's subordinates realized thai ihe tactical use of WMD had beaten Iran. Inhe former Regime used multiple helicopter sorties to drop CW-filled bombs on rebel groupsan of its strategy io end lhe revolt in lite South. That the Regime would consider this option with Coalition forces stillwithin Iraq's boundaries demonstrates both the dire nature of ihe situation and the Regimes faith in "special weapons:' bul two of Iraq's provinces1 were in open revolt and the Regime was worried.

The fall of Karltala deeply affected key decision-makers. Accordingormer senior member of the CW program, the Regime was shaking and wanted something "very quick and effective" to put down the revolt. Regime forces intended lo use the "liquid" to defeat dug-in forces as partarger assault.

Husaynhen Director of MIC, ordered senior officials in the chemical weapons program to ready CWfor use against the revolt. His initial instruction was to use VX. When informed ihai no VX was available he ordered mustard to be used.

Because of its delectable persistence, however, mustard was ruled out and Sarin selected for use. On orQ0 aerial bombs locatedat the Tamuz Airbase were readied for use. Helicopters from nearby bases flew to Tamuz, were armed with thes and other conventional ordnance. Dozens of sorties were flown against Shi'a rebels in Karbala andenior participant from the CW program estimates thatos were used.

Other reporting suggests as many asay have been dropped. As ofozenelicopters were staged at Tamuz Airbase. The caller said the attacks had been unsuccessful and further measures were required. One participant estimated lhat moreS filled aerial Itomhs were used on rebel targets in and around Karbala and Najaf. Trailers loaded with mustard-filled aerial bombs were also transported to lhe Tamuz Airanicipant in the operation staled thai mustard gas was not used on the rebels because of theof discovery by ihe Coalition.

According to the source, ihe mustard filled bombs were never unloaded and were not used. Reports of attacks1 from refugees and Iraqi military deserters include descriptionsange of CW and improvised poisons used in the areas around Karbala, Najaf. Saddam announced at the end of the war thai ihe Iranian army's backbone had been shattered by the war. Saddam staled that Iran would be unable to confront Iraqecade. Political divisions in Iran, weaknesses in Iranian military capabilities, and Iran's inabilityustain long-term offensive operations also reduced the risk of attack, according to ihe former chicf-of-staff.

Saddam was intoxicated with conceit. He believed he was unbeatable. He spoke of this to the Iraqiofficials and to visiting dignitaries from other Arab countries. This gavetrategic incentive to maintaincapabilities. Saddam said missile technology had been important to Iraq because Iraq could build its own ballistic missiles whereas Iran could not.

Saddam saw Iraq's nuclear programogical result of scientific and technical progress and was unconvinced by the notion of non-proliferation. He considered nuclearymbolodem nation, indicative of technological progress, aof economic development, and essential to political freedom at the international level what he described as "strategice wanted nuclear weapons to guarantee his legacy and to compete with powerful and antagonistic neighbors; to him, nuclear weapons were necessary for Iraq to survive.

Saddam wished to keep' active and his scientists employed and continuing iheir research. Saddam saidonversation of unknown date wiih Tariqand other unidentified senior officials: This conversation was very useful. We haveook at the international siltuition, and arrangetense our present and future steps during theseelieve that lite USA is concentrating on the Tar East, and all of the areas of South East Asia, for two mainand Pakistan.

The existence of the nuclear weapons in other countries makes the USA and Europe gel worried. Having nuclear weapons in these areas, with their economicknown by the VS. In the last fifteen years Japan appears to have improved itself to what they see now. Not only Japan but all of these countries have developed economically When it appears that there are nuclear weapons in Korea others will be allowed, under the doctrine of "self defense and balance ofo create the same industry.

The money and the weapons will he in an area outside Europe and the USA. At the same lime there wilt be more pressure on China to stop iheir South Korea or Japan'sl nuclear experiments. When nuclearare allowed in different places ihis pressure will decrease, and China will have the chance ta develop lis nuclear programs wiih less pressure from USA and Europe.

This is what die USA is interested in. Excerptslosed-Door Meeiing Between Saddam and Senior Personnel, January Iraqi Regime routinely, almost obsessively, engaged in the recording of its high level meetings, not in the conventional documentary form of more ordinary bureaucracies, but by way of audio ami videotapes. Despite ihe highly secret and sensitive nature ofCBW. Below is an example Of an audio recording recovered by ISC. Saddam: Then my design is right.

Husayn Kamil aiul Speakerbsolutely right, sir Husayn Kamil: Sir, if you'II allow me. Some of the chemicals now are distributed, this is according to lhe last reponfrom the Minister of Defense, which was submitted to you sir. Chemical warheads arc stored and are ready at Air Bases, and they know how and when to deal with, as well as arm these heads.

While some of the empty "stuff" is available'for us, our position is very good, and we don'i have any operational problems. Also, another bigger project will be finalizedonib. Saddam: what is it doing witbeed these germs to be fixed on the missiles, and tell him to hit. Husayn Kamil: doorir. Saddam: we want lhe long term, the many years kind Husaynhere lias toecision about which method of attack weighter bombighter plane.

Saddam: Wiih them all. This is for the germ and chemical weaponslso, all the Israeli cities, all of them. Of course you should concentrate on Tel Aviv, since it is their center. Husayn Kamil: Sir, the best way to transport ihis weapon and achieve lhe mosl harmful effects would come by using planes,rop plane: to scatter it.

This is. This is according to ihe analyses of the technicians Massive funds were allocated to develop infrastructure, equipment, scientific talent, and research. Byraq wasew years ofuclear weapon. Coalition bombing during Dcscn Storm, however, significantly damaged Iraq's nuclear facilities and the imposition of UN sanctions and inspections teams after the war further hobbled the program.

It appears Saddam shifted tactics lo preserve what he could of his program scientific talent, dual-use equipment, and designs while simultaneously attempting to rid Iraq of sanctions. In comparison to Iraq's nuclear and CWthe BW program wai more dependentmaller body of individual expertise. Scientists conducted research into fundamental aspects of bacteria, toxins, and viruses, emphasizing production, pathogenicity, dissemination and storage of agents, such as Clostridium botulinum.

Despite investing considerable effort in this first attempt. Iraq's BW program faltered. Iraq rebuilt and expanded the infrastructureesearch9ut undertook little work on military applications, aside from assassination-related research for the IIS seeIraq's Intelligence Services" for additional information. At the height of the Iran-Iraq warhe Regime revitalized the BWew BW group was recruited and research began on gas gangrene and botulinum toxin.

Byraq was methodically advancing toward the additionW component to its WMD arsenal. By the time of the Dcscn Storm, IraqW program thai included production of large quantities of severalbotulinum toxin, Clostridium perfringens. Iraq successfully weaponized some of these agents into ballistic missiles, aerial bombs, artillery shells, and aircraft spray tanks. After the Desert Storm, the Regime fabricated an elaborate cover story to hide the function of itsroduction facility at Al Hakam, while at the same time it continued to develop the sites potential.

The UN suspected bul could not confirm any major BW agenl production sites until Iraq partially declared its BW program prior to the departure of Husayn Kamilraq eventually owned up lo its offensive BW program later lhat year and destroyed the remaining facilities6 under UN supervision.

UN inspectors monitoredites deemed to have some potential useW program. Iraq's actions in the period up6 suggest that the former Regime intended to preserve iu BW capability and return fo steady, methodical progressature BW program when and if the opportunity arose. Whal Saddam Thought: External Concerns Saddam viewed Iraq as "underdeveloped" and therefore vulnerable to regional and globalSenior Regime members generally ranked Tehran first and Tel Avivore distant second as their primary adversaries, but no Iraqi oecision- maker asserted lhal either couniry was an imminent Challenge1.

He also privately told his top advisors, on multiple occasions, that he sought totrategic balance between the Arabs andiftcrent objective from deterring an Iranian strategic attack or blunting an Iranian invasion. Accordingamid Mahmud. Saddam "desired lor Iraq io possess WMD. He saw Iran as Iraq's abiding enemy and he sought io keep it in check. Saddam was keenly aware that, in addition to lhe potential of invasion. Iranian infiltralors could cause internal unrest.

Therefore, the orientation of most Iraqi ground forces toward the Iranian border remained unchanged throughout the sanctions period. Saddam argued Iraqi WMDwhile driven in part by the growth of Iranian capabilities, was also intended to provide Iraqinning edge against Iran. Saddam said US air strikes were lessorry lhan an Iranian land attack. Ramadan ihought WMD pnigrams mighi only be suspendedhort period of time in order to normalize Iraq's relations with the international community, and would have to be resumed if no substitute counterbalance to Iran was forthcoming.

Iloih 'Aziz and Huwaysh have stated in interviews thaimain focus was lhe danger from Iran. Earlier strikes on MEK targets had occurred in4 andut Iran had onlymall number o rockets. Saddam was very concerned about Iranianproduction capabilities. Atlendcdenior officers, the conference discussed Iran's pursuit ol nuclear weapons, acquisition of suitable delivery systems, and possession of missiles capable of carrying CW or BW warheadsange0 kilometers.

Saddam believed that Iran hnd benefited from the breakup of lhe former Soviet Union by gaining access to WMD as well as conventional technologies. Iraq mililary iroops trained wiih lhe expectation lhal Iran would use CW if Ii ir invaded.

If Iraq came under chemical or biological attack, the army would attempt io survive until the international community intervened. A former Corps commander slated that believed ibe next war would he foughthemical environment with heavy reliance upon missiles. Iraq assumed that Iran could manulacture CW and would use ll. The Iraqis had identified Iranian nuclear and chemical facilities as wellactories in Iran that Ihey assessed produced missile components.

Xraqi leaders determined lhal Tehran was moreong term danger lhan anone because of deficiencies in Iranian readiness and morale when compared againsi Iraqi training and Iraqi Intelligence Collection Against Iran intelligence services collected foreignon Iran and relayed the raw reporting to Saddam via his presidential secretary. Thetightly controlled dissemination of material. This raw intelligence that went to Saddam would not necessarily he sharedwith the deputy primeor military.

The National Security Committee, the body that coordinated Iraq's intelligence services, advised the vice president in1 that Iran would remain Iraq's foremaw enemy and that thewould rely heavily on missilesuture war, according to captured documents.

Intelligence collectionhole targeted Iran's weaponsits nuclear program, economic issues, and international relations. Human intelligence sources were the primary means of intelligence collection against Iran, supported by signals intelligence conducted by the IIS Directorate for - OS hadfficers to wort the Iranian target, accordingormer senior IIS officer.

The Iraqis also studied Jane's publications for information on foreign weapons systems. One senior officer spotlighted how important the Internet was to theirof general threat capabilities. The documents assessed probable Israeli Air Force tactics against Iraqi forces. Iraqi intelligence collected on the Iranian nuclear programus did not contradict Iranian Claims that their reactors being used for peaceful purposes, according to the former deputyof the IIS.

Iraq assumed Iran was attempting to develop nuclear weapons. IIS assets often passed along open source information as if it were intelligence, allowing disinformation to reach the upper levels of the former Regime. Iraqi leaders acknowledged Iran's advantages in population, income, and access to international armsas Iraq's former ally Russia began to arm Iran. Some Iraqis also believed lhc intema-lional community would halt if not deter an Iranian invasion.

Saddam accordingly decided to useas his primary tool against Iran, but he never wielded rt successfully. Iraq really had no coherent policy on how to deal with Tehran after Dcscn Storm, although, from the Iraqi point of view, the immediate risk was deemed to be low.

According to the former Iraqi Army Chief-of-Staffran would have difficultyarge surprise attack because Iraq would detect the extensive mobilization required for it. Iraqiobservers would detect Iranian troops as they assembled along probable invasion corridors. The former Iraqi Army COS said Iran enjoyedqualitative -ground superiority, according to the former defenseAlthough sanctions would haveajor impact. Iraqi forces arrayed along the border could survive the first two echelons of an Iranianforce without resorting to WMD.

After that they would be overrun. One senior Regime official, however, said that although the Iranian threat was real. Iraq consideredistorical enemy with desires for Iraqi territory. Israel United States can never he stability, security or peacethe region so long as there are immigrant Jews usurping the land ofaddam Husayn, Baghdad TV political disCussiun.!

Saddam's attitude toward Israel, although refketing defensive concerns, was hostile. Saddam considered Israel the common enemy of all. Arabs and thisthe attitudes of the Arab street inionist state. Moreover, it was reported that he considered himself theSalah-al-Din Saladin ivine mission to liberate Jerusalem.

Thisactic to win popular support in countries like Egypt. Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. He was aware of his prestigehampion of Palestine against Israel and consistently called for the liberation of Palestine from the "river to the sea" and warned that any Arab ruler who abandoned the Palestinians wouldeavyne said publicly: "When we speak alwut the enemies of Iraq, this means the enemies of the Arab nation.

When we speak about the enemies of the Arab nation, we mean ihe enemies of Iraq. This is because Iraq is in the heart, mind, and chest of the Arab nation" Saddam implied, according to the former presi-dential secretary, that Iraq would resume WMD programs after sanctions in order to restore the "strategic balance" within the region.

Israel appeared toival that had strategic dominanceossessed WMD and the ability to build relations with countries neighboring Iraq, such as Turkey and Iran, which could destabilize Iraq from within using ther Kurds. Iraqore focused risk of air and missile strikes from Israeli strategic forces, ratherroundormer senior official. Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osintk nuclear reactor spurred Saddam to build up Iraq's military to confront Israel in the.

Other Iraqi policy makers stated they could otherwise do little to influence Israel. Saddam did not consider the Unitedatural adversary, as he did Iran and Israel, and he hoped that Iraq might again enjoy improved relations with the United Slates, according to Tariq 'Aziz and the presidential secretary, Tariq 'Aziz pointederies of issues, which occurred between the end of the Iran-Iraq waro explain why Saddam failed to improve relations with the United States: Irangate the covert supplying of Iran with missiles, leakedontinuing US fleet presence in the Gulf,CIA links with Kurds and Iraqi dissidents and the withdrawal of agricultural export credits.

After Irangate. Saddam believed that Washington could not be trusted and that it was out to get himHis outlook encouraged him io anack Kuwait, and helps explain his later half-hearted concessions lo the West. These concerns collectively indicated to Saddam lhat there wus no hopeositivewith the United States in the period before the attack on Kuwait. Although the United States was notatural adversary, some Iraqi decision-makers viewed it as Iraq's most pressing concern,to former Vice President Ramadan.

Throughout, Saddam and the Ba'th Regimefull-scale invasion by US forces to be the most dangerous potential threat to unseating the Regime, although Saddam rated the probability of an invasion as very losv. The stumbling block in these feelers was the apparent Iraqi priority on maintaining both the Saddam Regime and the option of Iraqi WMD.

Saddam said he wanted to develop better relations with the US over the latter part of. He said, however, lhat he was nothance because the US refused to listen to anything Iraq had to say. Even if Iraq's military pcrtonned bener duringIraqi Freedom, Iraq would only have increased ihe number of Coalition casualties without altering the war's outcome, according to lhe former defense minister. Saddam failed to understand the United Stales, its internal or foreign drivers, or whjt it saw as itsin the Gulf region.

Little short of lhe prospeci of military action would gel Saddam lo focus on US policies. He told subordinates many times thatDesert Storm the United States had achieved all it warned in the Gull. He had no illusions about US military or technological capabilities, although he believed use Uniled States would not invade Iraq because of exaggerated US leant of casualties.

Saddam alsoore pessimistic view of the United States. Byaddam had persuaded himself, just as he didhal the United Slates would not attack Iraq hecuute it already had achieved its objectives ofilitary presence in lhe region, according to dciainee interviews.

Saddam speculated that he United Slates would instead seek lo avoid casualties and. Some Iraqi leaden did not consider the United States toong-term enemy, but many knew little about the Uniled Slates and less aboul itspolicyrmei advisors have also suggested thai Saddam never concluded that the United Slates would attemptverthrow him with an invasion. Iraq's Limited Intelligence on US Military Operations Iraq derived much of us understanding of US military capabilities from television and the Internet,to the former DGMI director Iraq obtained onty limited infarmatih-ilitary capabilities from its own intelligence assets, although ihey closely monitored the US buildup in Kuwait.

The assessment evaluated the size, imposition, and probableof US forces and identified the US aircraft carriers immediately available to attack Iraq. The AI Bakr University was using this information in computer modeling and war gaming collected reliable tactical intelligence against US forces in Kuwxiit and even knew when Operation Iraqi Freedom would start, accordingormer field-grade Republican Guard officer.

One senior officer spotlighted how important the Internet was in,bri p,thi! Internally, Iraq was in trouble. The economy wasin tatters. The middle class was decimated by the collapse of the dinar and the impact of sanctions. The hobbling of Saddam by the cease-fire resolution, UNSCR , was still persistingdespite vocal support of some members of the Security Council. Saddam had long refusedto accept the option of exporting oil with constraints on revenues.

He was concerned that, oncestarted, the pressure on the Security Council to lift sanctions—his real goal—would be lifted. It was clear he was using the pain endured by his people and the concern by some members ofthe Security Council that sustaining civil destruction as pressure to get the Security Council toremove the sanctions.

However, by , it became apparent that the United States had a lock in9 December The United States and United Kingdom reacted militarily with a circumscribedbombing campaign that took place between the time President Clinton completed a previouslyscheduled visit to Israel and the beginning of Ramadan, about four days later.

The Security Council was left deeply divided. The Iraqis were satisfied with the outcome. They said,given a choice of sanctions with inspections or sanctions without inspections, they would preferwithout. It included largely at Russian insistence language about the suspension and ultimate lifting of sanctions.

Nevertheless, Iraq ignored its demands and also paid no further consequences. Clearly their strategywas to erode sanctions, and they saw no need to accept a new set of inspectors. By , the erosion of sanctions accelerated. The semi-annualdebates over the renewal of sanctions in the Security Council became the forum for Iraqi proponentsto argue the case for relaxing sanctions further. This was an attempt to bolster support for sanctions within theSecurity Council by narrowing the targeted items subject to scrutiny.

There was a reversal of apresumption of denial to a presumption of approval of items to be acquired under the Oil-For-Food program. Syria had recently signed an oil export protocol that provided for reopening of the Iraq-Syriapipeline. Initially, the United States tried to curtail this program, but failed. Baghdad could readthis turn of events only as growing momentum of its strategy to undermine sanctions with thegoal of an ultimate collapse.

The new administration in Washington gave no evidence of changing the approach toward Iraq. The sanctions debate in the Security Council in June was indicative with the Russiansdemanding further relaxation and a concrete signal from the Council that sanctions would belifted if Iraq satisfied the elements of UNSCR France, Russia, andSyria then a member of the Security Council were all quite vocally supporting Iraq in sanctionsdebates in the Security Council.

Prohibited goods and weapons were being shipped into Iraq with virtually no problem. The onlynotable items stopped in this flow were some aluminum tubes, which became the center of debateover the existence of a nuclear enrichment effort in Iraq. Major items had no trouble gettingacross the border, including liquid-fuel rocket engines.

Indeed, Iraq was designing missilesystems with the assumption that sanctioned material would be readily available. Politically, the Iraqis were losing their stigma. The Baghdad International Fair in November was attended by hundreds of companies. The Rasheed Hotel was filled with businessmen fromall over the world. Funding filled the coffers of various ministries. The11 Acknowledgements 12 September This report is the product of the hundreds of individuals who participated in the efforts of IraqSurvey Group ISG : The Australian, British, and American soldiers, analysts, and support personnelwho filled its ranks.

They carried out their roles with distinction, and their work reflectscreditably on the commitment of Washington, London, and Canberra to firmly support the missionthroughout a long and difficult period. On April 26, Sgt. Baker and Sgt. Lawrence A. Roukey died while providing security for one of the most criticalISG investigations when an explosion destroyed the facility being inspected.

Their memory hasbeen present throughout the creation of this report. The analysts and case officers who came to Iraq, most for the first time, worked hard to developthe information to support this report. They labored long hours to develop intelligence reportsand the text that became this report, a difficult task to which they responded with enthusiasm.

This report also builds upon the work of a broader universe of people who have striven to understandthe role of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq during the past decade or more. UnitedNations inspectors and analysts around the world have wrestled with this issue trying to sort outreality and develop policies to mitigate suffering and avoid conflict. Hopefully this report willprovide some answers or at least more data for constructive review.

Mention must be made of the Iraqis themselves. It is important for an outsider to understandfully the dilemmas encountered and choices made by individuals under the former Regime, manyof them energetic and brilliant people who participated in the programs and decisions addressedhere. ISG analysts have spoken with many of them—both in detention and free.

Some have triedto help us understand what happened; others were too fearful to help. Still others had many reasonsto reveal as little as possible. Nevertheless, I hope that the characterization of events offeredhere will be seen as a fair representation by those who are, after all, the real experts, the Iraqiparticipants.

The tragedy of Iraq is perhaps best seen on the individual level. I have known many of their mostsenior technocrats and political leaders for over a decade. I have spent hours with them in meetingstrying to unravel circumstances and events. We have met in large government offices, theUntied Nations, in laboratories and now in jails or tents.

They are some of the best and brightestthe country has produced. Some clearly did so with relish and happilyreaped the rewards that were bestowed. Others, with better intentions, had limited options, giventhe nature of the Regime. Through the accident of birth, they were placed in circumstances mostof us are never tested by.

The new Iraq shouldseek recompense from some others who profited from the promotion of the worst deeds of theRegime. Readers of the procurement and finance section of the report will gain some appreciationof how rewards were dispensed. Many Iraqis over many years tried hard to explain Iraq and these programs to me.

This was noteasy for them and carried substantial risk. I am grateful to them beyond words. The intelligence services of three nations supported ISG, a long and demanding task. Australia providedsome of the best intelligence analysts anywhere. While these institutions expressed interestin the finding and certainly were curious where their pre-war assessments went wrong, they didnot try to steer in any way the judgments included here. In the end, this is not an Intelligence Community product.

I have had the assistanceof many people, but I chose the directions and methodologies, which are not typical of theintelligence community. Yet, in future decisions, I chose the frame of reference outlined. Wherethere were decisions to be made on interpretation or judgment, they are mine.

This will not be the last word on the Iraqi experience with WMD. Many may argue with theinterpretation given here. To further that public debate, and in the interest of the historian towhom this subject is likely to be of considerable interest, I have been firmly committed tomaking this report unclassified.

I have also opted on the side of inclusion of material — even ifsensitive for one reason or another — rather than exclusion. The data can be interpreted by others,now and in the future, to form their own judgments. I was given neither guidance nor constraints, and tasked only to find the truth. Ihave tried to do that. It also attempts to place theevents in their Political-Military context. In prewar planning, it was assumed chemical and possibly biological stocks were likelyto be encountered and perhaps employed.

Forces were equipped with protective equipment. Many sites were inspected but with an aim ofdiscovering WMD, not inspecting and developing an analytical assessment of the Iraqi programs. Wartime conditions prevailed with concern about force protection primary. The work of XTFwas therefore aimed at discovery of possible WMD locations to eliminate a threat , not the compilationof evidence to build a picture of what happened to the weapons and programs. This early approach, perhaps logical if the goal was simply to find hidden weapons, underminedthe subsequent approach of piecing together the evidence of the Iraqi WMD programs suchas they existed.

In fact, combined with the chaos of the war and the widespread looting in theimmediate aftermath of the conflict, it resulted in the loss of a great amount of potentially veryvaluable information and material for constructing a full picture of Iraqi WMD capabilities.

Siteswere looted. Documents were either ignored or collected haphazardly or burned by either theRegime or Coalition forces. Hebrought together a unique blend of collection, analytic, and force maneuver assets to conductboth the ongoing WMD investigation and secondary tasks that included counterterrorism and thesearch for Captain Scott Speicher, a US Navy pilot shot down in during Desert Storm. Several participants were former UnitedNations inspectors with long experience in Iraq.

Documentation Exploitation—A forward linguistic element in Baghdad approximately identifies documents of immediate importance from the millions recovered in the course of thewar and occupation. A large facility housing more than staff members in Qatar recorded,summarized, and translated documents.

At the time of this writing, this facility houses about 36million pages that have been scanned into a database. Recently, ISG obtained about 20, boxes of additional documents, which had been stored inCoalition-occupied buildings. Many of these documents are from the Iraqi Intelligence Service1 and the Baath party. This is a volume roughly equivalent to the total received to date—a hugeinfusion.

Triage of these documents will probably take several months. New information willinevitably derive from this process, but may not materially affect the overall elements of thisreport. Statements by former key players in the Regime formed an important informationsource, but must be evaluated very cautiously since the prospect of prosecution inevitablyaffected what they said.

It is also important to understand that the population of senior detaineesheld at the Camp Cropper facility interacted freely among themselves. They could consult onwhat they were asked, and the pressures and tensions among detainees over cooperation withISG certainly affected their candor. In addition, debriefers were not experts in the field of Iraq orWMD as a general rule. ISG compensated by having subject matter experts present as often aspossible. Samples included nerve agent rounds, mustard shells, and awide range of dangerous chemical substances.

The Director of Central Intelligence provided additional analytic and collection support andnamed a senior Special Advisor for Iraqi WMD to provide direction to the overall effort. Kay provided an initial report to the DCI in September on the early findings of theinvestigation.

Under his leadership, ISG interviewed many key participants in the WMD programs,undertook site visits, and began the review of captured documents. Under Dr. Kay, ISGfocused on leads from Iraqi sources, documents, and physical evidence. Work in Iraq was very difficult.

First, many sites had beenreduced to rubble either by the war or subsequent looting. The coalition did not have the man-2 power to secure the various sites thought to be associated with WMD. Hence, as a military unitmoved through an area, possible WMD sites might have been examined, but they were left soonafter. Looters often destroyed the sites once they were abandoned. On the one hand, those who cooperated risked retribution from former Regimesupporters for appearing to assist the occupying power.

On the other hand, there was substantialrisk that the Coalition would incarcerate these individuals. Hence, for the most part, individualsrelated to Iraqi WMD tried to avoid being found. Even long after the war, many Iraqi scientistsand engineers find little incentive to speak candidly about the WMD efforts of the previousRegime. This is exacerbated by their life-long experience of living with the threat of horriblepunishment for speaking candidly. The third constraint was the growing risk from the insurgency.

From roughly November onward, it was very difficult to simply travel to points of interest by investigators. Armored carsand protection by military units were required. Many ISG armored vehicles were damaged ordestroyed by hostile fire or improvised explosive devices, and two military personnel lost theirlives assisting the investigation, SGT Sherwood R. A fourth hurdle was that, given the difficult conditions existing in Iraq, many individuals hadlittle interest in remaining in Iraq for a lengthy time, and typically an analyst would come to ISGfor only a couple of months, which produced great inefficiencies: Individuals would becomefamiliar with certain Iraqi issues and then depart.

Many detainees were interviewed multipletimes by a number of analysts seeking answers to the same question. Despite these obstacles, a core of knowledge was built, and some long-term Iraqi experts becamekey members of the ISG team. Theirbackground and knowledge were invaluable. For example, it is much more difficult though stillquite possible for Iraqis to deceive investigators they had known for 10 years or more.

At anygiven time, ISG staff included approximately 15 to 20 Iraq WMD experts, though as time wenton, it became more difficult to retain a truly expert cadre. A timeline methodology was used to integrate key elements of the analysis and to assist thebuilding of the corporate knowledge base. Through regular meetings of all functional teams,analysis of the range of events that interacted with respect to WMD was conducted. Relevant data points wereidentified and manipulated on a timeline tool, and major inflection points that related to Saddamand WMD were established.

These were then used by teams, especially the Regime StrategicIntent team, to cue further analysis and to develop their respective portions of the report. Looking to the future, there will continue to be reports of WMD-related material that must beaddressed. This is a continuous taskthat often requires the removal of dangerous objects like mortar rounds or dangerous chemicals.

This element of ISG work accounts for much of the effort of many of the staff during the past18 months. The necessary investigation of all reasonable leads has led to dozens of missions that3 have been important, though they have found no significant stocks of WMD. Such missions haveincluded, for example, extensive underwater searches using sophisticated sensor equipment inIraqi lakes and rivers. Since there remains the possibility though small of remaining WMD, such reports will continueto be evaluated and investigated as judged necessary.

Sources of InformationIraqi detainees were a major source of information. Many WMD-associated figures have beendetained at Camp Cropper where the so-called high-value detainees are incarcerated. Analystsquestioned them repeatedly about aspects of the program and Regime decisionmaking.

Theiranswers form a large part of the data ISG has used in this report, but must be considered for whatthey are. These individuals have had long experience living under a severe Regime that imposedharsh consequences for revealing state secrets and have no way of knowing what will happen tothem when they get out. Certainly there are strong Regime supporters among the Camp Cropperpopulation. The word inevitably circulates among them who is cooperative and who is not.

Oncereleased, such detainees may fear for their lives from Regime supporters. Another consideration is that many senior Regime figures are concerned about prosecution andwill shape their tales to serve their interests. On the other hand, some of these individuals have been long-term technocrats with no particularlove of the Regime. Of these, some have been quite helpful, particularly with former inspectorswhom they have known well over the years.

Nevertheless, it must also be remembered that theirperspectives, even if honestly conveyed, may not reflect the views of the Regime leadership. The documentation that ISG has accumulated is extensive. It has yielded important nuggets,which pop out as linguists make their way though the massive amount of material. The magnitudeof the task is huge and complicated by the potential of errors in transliteration or in theoriginal documents.

Since it is impossible to forecast when relevant documents will be found inthis largely unordered collection, it may well be that documents or electronic media may emergethat could significantly add to the themes and background presented here. A vital part of the picture of how the Regime proceeded with respect to UN sanctions is illustratedin its implementation of the Oil for Food program. Thedata presented here are intended only to demonstrate the tactics and strategy of the Regime.

Iraqsought to influence these data links to many countries and individuals. This report stops at thatpoint. The report does not intend to analyze or assess the implications for non-Iraqis. Others are charged with investigating these transactions. What is clear is that theRegime sought to reward and influence using this tool. Physical inspection of sites has been pursued to the extent possible.

This is a dangerous activityunder the circumstances of We had two fatalities, and ISG teams have been shot at manytimes with some serious injuries. Many armored cars have been destroyed in attacks. This hasmade site investigations more difficult. Moreover, many locations associated with the previous WMD programs and sites under monitoringby the United Nations have been completely looted. In fact, the sites that filled the databaseof monitored locations are radically different postwar.

Equipment and material in the majorityof locations have been removed or ruined. Often there is nothing but a concrete slab at locationswhere once stood plants or laboratories. A final consideration of the work of ISG concerns the return of sovereignty to Iraq. Since 28 June, Iraq has been responsible for its own territory, and that includes matters associated withWMD questions.

Gradually, more cooperation in investigatory work can take place. It is a natural transitionof responsibility and knowledge to the new government. WMD concerns are not merely of historic interest. ISG chemical weapons CW and counterterrorismexperts uncovered and tracked down an active insurgent group that had been usingformer Regime CW experts to attempt to create and use CW for use against the Coalition. Thiswas dubbed the Al Abud network after the location of the first raid where insurgents were foundattempting to acquire ricin.

A very aggressive investigation by ISG and a series of raids haveapparently been successful in containing this threat. This has been a major success, but willrequire sustained attention by both Coalition and IIG since terrorists have long demonstrated anintention to obtain WMD and use it.

This could occur inside or outside Iraq. There will also be new information from individuals andsources, which will come to light. Moreover, certain defined questions remain unanswered. Forexample, we cannot express a firm view on the possibility that WMD elements were relocated outof Iraq prior to the war.

Reports of such actions exist, but we have not yet been able to investigatethis possibility thoroughly. Likewise, there remains some uncertainty concerning reports of mobileBW capabilities—though we have conducted an extensive investigation and we have a paucity ofconfirmatory information, there is still some possibility that such a capability did exist.

As new information becomes available and is analyzed and assembled into meaningful packages,further unclassified additions to this report may be issued. This report addresses the actions and considerations of the Regime until it fell in April Itattempts to show the WMD programs and their context. It combines analysis of both physicalevidence and an examination of the considerations of the Regime leadership with regard to WMD. The report is not intended to be predictive but should provide data from which others may considersuch questions and indeed, consider implications for other circumstances elsewhere.

Saddam Husayn, January This page intentionally left blank. ContentsKey Findings He wanted to endsanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction WMD whensanctions were lifted. He initiated most of the strategicthinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace such as invading Kuwait ,maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community.

Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes onstrategic issues were rare. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of anyWMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions andjeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring.

The Regime quickly cameto see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and toprovide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both interms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion,irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballisticmissile and tactical chemical warfare CW capabilities.

The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab worldwere also considerations, but secondary. He believed that duringthe Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attackson Tehran had broken its political will. Neitherwas there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam.

Instead, his lieutenantsunderstood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent,but firm, verbal comments and directions to them. Many of these responseswere lengthy and detailed. Remarks from thedebriefer are included. Analysts used subsource development and document exploitation to crosscheck detainee testimony, leveragedetainees in debriefs, and to fill gaps in information.

For example, analysts interviewing Huwaysh gainedinsights into his personality from subsources, while translated technical and procurement-related documentswere critical to verifying the accuracy of his testimony. Nonetheless, the interview process had several shortcomings. Detainees were very concerned about their fateand therefore would not be willing to implicate themselves in sensitive matters of interest such as WMD, inlight of looming prosecutions.

He never discussed actions, which would implicate himin a crime. Some obstructed all attempts to elicit information on WMD and illicit activities of the formerRegime. Others, however, were keen to help clarify every issue, sometimes to the point of self-incrimination.

His circumlocution extends to most other sensitive subjects ofRegime behavior. By contrast, Sabir has been forthcoming to the point of direct association with a wide rangeof Iraqi activities, including the management of Kuwaiti prisoners, the organization of assassinations abroadby the former Iraqi Intelligence Service IIS , and the torture of political prisoners.

Regime StrategicIntent3 This page intentionally left blank. Bythe time of Desert Storm, there was no constitutionalthreat to his position of authority. He wascool under pressure. For example, Huwaysh,while not in a position of power at the time, pointedto the sudden and unconsultative manner in whichSaddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait, despite theamount of planning and forethought that had goneinto the scheme. In contrast, limited evidence suggeststhat after Saddam attempted to detachhimself from the minutiae of working with the UN.

Regime StrategicIntentPersonalized RuleSaddam dominated all Iraqi institutions by the earlys and increasingly administered by personaldirection. Moreover, Saddam, particularlyearly in his rule, was fond of micromanagement in allaspects of government. All refer to the same institution. Manyaccepted the limits of their personal influence inreturn for membership in a privileged class, becauseof a personal identification with the goals of theRegime and realization of the personal consequencesshould it fall.

Saddam was keen to maintain this perception. Saddam reserved the right tomake final decisions, and former advisors reveal thathe often disregarded their advice. Saddam made fewpublic statements regarding WMD, and his deliberationswere tightly compartmented and undocumentedafter the s. Toward the end of his rule Saddambecame more reclusive and relied even less uponadvisors for decision-making, while turning more andmore to relatives.

Many, however, believethat Saddam would have resumed WMD programsafter sanctions were lifted. Saddamroutinely met with the Cabinet, its committeesand the RCC, but participants say they often hadlittle latitude. Detaineesfrom various organizations suggest they carriedout national security policy rather than created it,although Huwaysh had considerable autonomy inhis planning efforts.

Saddam perceived Iraqiforeign policy through the prism of the Arab worldand Arabic language. He listened to the Arabicservices of Voice of America and the BBC, andhis press officers would read him translations offoreign media, but he appeared more interested inbooks and topics about the Arab world.

Saddam told a US interviewer he tried to understandWestern culture, and admitted he relied onmovies to achieve this. Detainees frequently mentionverbal instructions from Saddam. His subordinatesregarded these commands, whether given in privateor in public, as something to be taken seriously andat face value. Saddam was explicit—particularly onissues of a personal or state security nature, whichwere one and the same to him.

The Regime did nottake action on WMD or security issues in a documentedway using the Iraqi equivalent of publicpolicy statements, cabinet minutes or written presidentialexecutive orders. Another source is theInternet—it has everything. Wecould see it on the Internet, as well—it was all there. For another example, we know that there was preplannedstorage equipment in Qatar and Kuwait,equipment without personnel. The threemembers were ordered verbally by Saddam to formand operate the committee.

Regime policy files on securityissues have not been found following the fallof the Regime and—judging by the ashes found inIraqi Government offices—may have been comprehensivelydestroyed. But there is some documentary evidence. Access to electronic informationtechnology varied widely.

Even manual typewriterswere not available in some places. Pre-electroniccopying systems such as carbon paper donot appear to have been widespread. Hand-writtenrecords including many of limited legibility arecommon. A high level order in the s directedthat Top Secret orders were to be hand-written toavoid the need for typing staff to see them. At the very least they would seek toavoid outcomes he was known to detest or dislike. His more experiencedassociates, such as Ramadan, found Saddamto be predictable and they were able to work to thelimits of his tolerance.

That said, fear of Saddammeant that rumor about his wishes could acquire considerableforce and make Regime attempts to changecourse sometimes awkward to implement. MIC staff,for example, initially did not believe that Saddamhad decided to abandon the program to withholdinformation from inspectors. Vice President Ramadan had tobe dispatched in early to personally explain thenew policy to skeptical and fearful MIC staff. Compartmentation, whenaccompanied by his encouragement of backchannelcommunication, see Harvesting Ideas and Advicein Byzantine Setting section , occasionally led to two or more teams working the same problem.

Saddam was normally ableto realign projects when he needed to but checks andbalances among political and security forces of theRegime remained a feature of his rule to the end. Saddam Shows the WaySaddam gave periodic unambiguous guidance to awider audience than his immediate subordinates. He wrote his own speeches. He was unafraid ofdetail and personally intervened with instructions inall areas of government administration at all levels.

Problems arose if Saddam or his lieutenants hadnot given junior subordinates his views on an issue,leaving them in doubt about policy or their authorityin a system where conformity was valued and failureto follow orders often brutally punished.

This latter problem became acute after whenSaddam became more reclusive and his comprehensivespeeches became less frequent. Saddam was strictly opposed to corruption—in thesense of Regime personnel soliciting bribes or expropriatingpublic assets—on the part of family membersor subordinate members of the Regime, seeing it ascorrosive of respect for authority.

Personal corruptioncould be punished drastically and Saddam issuedmany directions about what he expected in terms ofpersonal financial behavior. Instead, Saddam reservedfor himself the right to dispense the fruits of theRegime, thereby making those who benefited frompower sure they were doing so exclusively at his will.

He directed that halfof hidden property be given as a reward to whoeverreported the deception. Harvesting Ideas and Advice in a ByzantineSettingSaddam did not encourage advice from subordinatesunless he had first signaled he wanted it. Advisorygroups he established, such as the Committee of Four the Quartet on foreign, political and strategic policy,considered only those issues he referred to them.

Committees generally assumed Saddam already had apreferred position on such issues and commonly spenttime trying to guess what it was and tailor their adviceto it. More conscientious members of the Regimesought to work around sycophantic or timid superiorsby cultivating alternative, direct lines of communicationto Saddam—a development that pleased Saddambecause it put another check on subordinates.

Theresult, however, was a corrosive gossip culture insenior government circles that further undercut anysemblance of developing policy through conventionalgovernment procedures. Additionally, Saddam said hefound women to be great sources of information,particularly within the various government ministries. The project never progressed beyond twoprototypes and Huwaysh stated that the programwas ultimately an expensive failure.

Fear of the loss of position motivated thisdeception, which continued until the final days ofthe Regime. Regime StrategicIntentWeaving a Culture of LiesThe growth of a culture of lying to superiors hurtpolicymaking more than did the attendant gossip. Lying to superiors was driven by fear of the Regimeand the inability to achieve results as resources deterioratedunder sanctions in the first half of the s.

Lack of structural checks and balances allowed falseinformation to affect Iraqi decision making withdisastrous effects. Key commanders overstated their combatreadiness and willingness to fight, and Saddam nolonger sought ground truth by visiting units andasking pointed questions as he had during the Iran-Iraq war. He instead relied upon reports by officerswho later admitted misleading Saddam about militaryreadiness out of fear for their lives.

Saddam Became Increasingly InaccessibleSaddam encouraged a sense of his omnipotenceamong his subordinates, a condition that increasedafter as Saddam became more physicallyreclusive. The former workaholic and micromanagerappeared less engaged after this time, although hewould involve himself in issues of interest, such as airdefense.

They suggesthis formerly detailed interest in military affairs diminishedcompared to that shown during the Iran-Iraqwar or Desert Storm. Simply locatingSaddam could be a problem even for seniorofficials. Hikmat said Saddam was confident noone could assassinate him because no one knewwhere he slept, and ministerial meetings were heldat undisclosed locations.

Ministers were pickedup and driven to the meeting locations in vehicleswith blacked out windows, and they were nevertold where they were once they arrived at meetings,according to a former senior official. He lost much of his contact with the government. He still attended RCC meetings, but he met onlyinfrequently with the Quartet.

During thelate s, he spent more time in his palaces;subordinates had to forward documents to himbecause they could no longer communicate directlywith him. Although Saddam still sought detailedreporting, he did not process it with the diligencethat characterized his approach to paperwork adecade earlier.

Instead, he turnedmore toward family members, such as Qusay. Riyad, in response to an appealby Saddam for creative ideas on how to end the warwith Iran, had made the fatal mistake of suggestingthat Saddam temporarily resign and resume officeafter peace was achieved. In the s, he witnesseda number of soldiers being executed after theydeserted. This order is posted by the Security Unit divisionmanager and it is timed below. Dated 20 Feb The legally powerful cabinet never metin later years as a deliberative body.

When it didmeet—for information or ratification purposes—Saddam avoided agendas. The same occurred at RCCmeetings. Instead, when business required an agenda,such as dealing with issues requiring cross-portfoliodecisions, Saddam met Ministers individually or assub-committees. Likewise, attendees often had nopreparation for what Saddam might raise.

Hewould simply raise an issue. Regime StrategicIntentPowerless StructuresIraq under Saddam had all the formal decisionmakingstructures and staff of a modern state, butthey did not make national strategic policy. Iraqpossessed a skilled foreign ministry and able technocratsin all branches of government.

They played little partin the effective chain of command under Saddam, andthey did not exercise a decision-making or executiverole comparable to nominally similar organs inWestern states. It gave Saddam theright to make emergency decisions in its name in thes, and he used this authority to reduce the RCCto irrelevance. This propensity extended to Saddamassuming authority over national policy on WMDdevelopment and retention.

Moreover, only Saddam could call an RCC meeting. He additionallyenhanced his control through regular meetingswith experts and leaders in industry and academia,according to Ramadan. The Higher Committee displayed from theoutset all the dysfunctional characteristics of administrationunder Saddam. It was beset by backchannelcommunications to Saddam from individual membersthat prevented the Committee from developingpolicy on WMD that was not prone to interventionfrom Saddam.

The Committee was plagued by a lackof transparency, gossip and family court interests. He only wanted to retainoversight on decisions that the committee foundinsolvable or costly, such as the destruction of alarge industrial complex.

Saddamset the agenda, which was ad hoc and varied. Neither the Political Operations Room nor theQuartet had a policymaking role. Instead, theyoffered advice, but only on issues referred to them bySaddam. They had none of the proactive or directivepowers normally associated with such senior committeesin the West or elsewhere.

Moreover, they wereweakened by the Byzantine administrative practicescommon to the higher levels of the Regime. It also discussed the Arab-Israelisituation and the dispatch of envoys. Saddam created the Committee of Four, or Quartet,in as a foreign policy advisory body to replacethe Political Operations Room. The RCC also considered foreign policy issues butusually in the form of briefings from Saddam orexpert staff and usually did little more than endorsethe decision Saddam had already determined.

Saddam was more inclined toaccept RCC advice about more junior level governmentappointments. WMD-related topics were neverdiscussed outside the RCC and rarely outside theQuartet members, according to the former presidentialsecretary. These topics would not be open fordiscussion.

Instead he first used the HigherCommittee to lobby Saddam to approve UN overflights and to allow UN inspectors to interview Iraqiscientists, but without success. Faced with a UNultimatum to agree, and with Saddam in one of hisperiods of self-imposed seclusion, Ramadan exhibiteda rare display of independent decision-makingand exercised his own authority to authorize the UNover flights.

Saddam had direct command of the Iraqi intelligenceservices and the armed forces, includingdirect authority over plans and operations of both. The Regime tightlycontrolled dissemination of such material. Materialgoing to Saddam would not necessarily be sharedwith the responsible deputy prime minister or themilitary. MIC at certain timesin its history covered all industries and most activitiesthat supported the research, development, productionand weaponization of CBW agents and missile deliverysystems.

While as an institution MIC had organizationalcontinuity, substantively there were twoMICs, each distinguishable by unique historical circumstancesand its links to a prominent leader. Husayn Kamil createdthe first MIC in , which continued in variousforms—including a major overhaul in —untilhis flight to Jordan in Saddamwas interested in their loyalty, discretion and abilityto achieve results.

Both Husayn Kamil andHuwaysh were therefore given more license and lessdirect oversight than the army leadership or the RCC,although Saddam would often ask about particularprojects or facilities. His capricious and self-serving leadership of MICand lack of accountability eventually destroyed itsinstitutional integrity, a process further aggravatedby his departure in Huwaysh instituted strict organizational andfinancial reforms, centered on mandatory planningand personnel accountability.

By , MIC wasthriving, its total revenues increasing over fortyfold as had its revenue base, despite continuing UNsanctions and coalition attacks on its facilities. Re-creation of theMIC began in under Huwaysh, who by hadreorganized and completely restructured the organization.

Huwaysh introduced mandatory planning, financialoversight and personal accountability in order to setthe organization on a modern accountable managementbase. Salaries were raised and re-engagementwith the MoD took place. Universities were encouragedto contribute to MIC projects and research,while production was outsourced to the private sector,with considerable success.

Regime StrategicIntent17 Saddam Holding CourtSaddam made shells of state institutions that in mostother countries would be organs of executive power. Under Saddam, they existed largely for appearanceand as lightning rods for blame. This divisionof responsibilities allowed Saddam to take the credit,while institutions took the blame. Blame shifting was typical of Saddam. Nonetheless, from time to time in uncontroversialnon-crisis situations, Saddam would revert back toformal decision-making structures to conduct business.

Ramadan commented that he did not knowwhat would prompt Saddam to resort to the formalchain of command at a particular point of time. Saddam and Fiscal PolicySaddam ignored his economic advisors in the Ministriesof Finance and Planning with respect to strategicplanning. For example, Saddam entered the Iran-Iraqwar heedless of Ministry warnings about the economicconsequences. He had no plan or strategy forhow the war was to be financed and generally displayedlittle interest in economic policy.

He showedlittle concern about adjusting disastrous economicpolicies such as those causing inflation in the interestsof social stability. He did, however, pay closeattention to disbursements. He made sure he couldtake the credit for public sector pay raises or specialallocations such as bonuses to particular sections ofthe Iraqi population.

He took less interest in whethersuch outlays were affordable or their effect on fiscalmanagement. Internal debtwas paid by printing dinars and concocting artificialexchange rates, regardless of the inflationary consequences.

He reported directly to Saddam andnot to the cabinet. He worked systematicallyto extract what they could contribute to theRegime, while keeping them politically isolated. Saddam was careful to keep subordinates from gainingpopularity.

It would be suicide. He wasroutinely suspicious of subordinates—even those withlong standing loyalty. His subordinates remained fearfulof him, and they were incapable of common actionagainst him or key policies. He was monitoringmy performance in managing [UN] inspectors.

Saddam had an enthusiasticattitude toward science dating back to when, in theearly s, he found himself in charge of the IraqiAtomic Energy Commission IAEC as part of hisresponsibilities as Vice President.

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